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Introduction
One measure of an economy's Þnancial market integration is the terms at which it can borrow in international capital markets. According to a basic deÞnition, a country may be "perfectly integrated" if it can borrow (and lend) at the prevailing world interest rate, however the latter is speciÞed. Due, however, to factors such as default risk, a developing economy may be subject to an external constraint that regulates the terms at which it borrows from abroad. A way of capturing this idea in a reduced-form framework is to specify that the interest rate on debt depends on a country's ability to service its existing level of international obligations. This leads to an "upward-sloping" interest rate relationship in which the rate on debt rises with the level of indebtedness, where the latter can be scaled by a measure, such as GDP, of the economy's ability to pay. An early use of this idea was employed by Bardhan (1967) and has, more recently, been taken up by researchers such as Pitchford (1989) , Bhandari et. al. (1990) , Fisher (1995) , Agénor (1998) , Fisher and Terrell (2000) , and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004) , all of whom use the representative agent framework. These authors employ this relationship to study the intertemporal impact of macroeconomic disturbances, such as domestic Þscal policy and world interest rate shocks, on indebted open economies In analyzing economies with this type of interest rate function, an important feature is whether or not agents take into account the "upward-sloping" nature of the relationship; in other words, whether or not agents recognize that their borrowing decisions affect the equilibrium interest rate on debt instruments. The models of Pitchford (1989) , Bhandari et al. (1990) , and Agénor (1998) specify that agents do recognize the fact that greater foreign borrowing raises the interest rate on debt, while the work of Fisher (1995) , Fisher and Terrell (2000) , and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004) assumes, on the other hand, that agents take the interest rate on debt as given in making their optimal choices. The latter formulation can be interpreted as a model of sovereign debt, with the interest rate relationship incorporating a "country speciÞc" interest cost function that is rising (and convex) in a measure of the economy's indebtedness. 1 Nevertheless, as Pitchford (1989) , among others, points out, the "country speciÞc" speciÞcation results in a borrowing externality. While this externality is not (necessarily) crucial for the results of the work cited above, we show in our framework that it does play an important role in characterizing the economy's steady-state and saddlepath dynamics. Indeed, one of the goals of this paper is to compare the dynamic properties of the two speciÞcations of borrowing behavior, which, in certain respects, is more complex if these decisions are "internalized."
A developing economy need not only be "ridden" with one externality, however. Indeed, consumption and production externalities can also play a crucial role in inßuencing the evolution of developing economies. In this paper we consider how consumption externalities affect an economy subject to an external borrowing constraint. Consumption externalities arise in our framework because we assume that agents gain utility not only from their individual consumption of goods and services, but also from their relative social position, or status. Using survey data suggesting that higher levels of average income do not necessarily translate into higher levels of personal satisfaction, Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 and Oswald (1997) infer, in contrast, that social position is a key factor in determining overall well-being. 2 In our reduced-form speciÞcation of instantaneous preferences, social status is conferred by relative consumption, so that the consumption externality in our model corresponds to the developing economy's average, or aggregate, level of consumption. There is a growing literature that investigates the inßuence of consumption externalities in dynamic macroeconomies. Representative authors who considered this issue in the closed economy context include Galṍ (1994) , Rauscher (1997) , Grossmann (1998) , Fisher and Hof (2000a, b) , Dupor and Liu (2003) , and Liu and Turnovsky (2004) . 3 We extend this work by analyzing consumption externalities in the case of a two-good, open economy, subject to an external borrowing constraint. SpeciÞcally, we assume that it is the relative consumption of imported goods that confers social position, an idea that is, we believe, plausible in the case of a developing economy where foreign "luxuries" represent status goods. 2 More general studies of the economic implications of the quest for social status are provided by Frank (1985) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992) . To curtail potentially wasteful status competition, Frank (1997) advocates instituting a progressive consumption tax, implemented by exempting savings from taxation. 3 An alternative branch of this line of research speciÞes that status depends on relative wealth, rather than on relative consumption. Recent authors who have employed this approach include Corneo and Jeanne (1997) , Futagami and Shibata (1998) , and Fisher (2004) . Fisher (2004) shows how relative wealth preferences can be used to obtain-in the context of the small open economy Ramsey model with perfect capital mobility-an interior, steady-state saddlepoint. General discussions of the problem of obtaining interior steady states in a small open context are found in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), [ch. 3, pp. 101-25] and Turnovsky (1997) , [ch. 2, pp. 36-47 and ch. 3, pp. 57-77] . One way of dealing with this issue is to impose an external borrowing constraint, an approach we adopt in this paper.
The basic framework we employ closely follows Fisher (1995) : (i) the developing economy is modelled as a representative consumer-producer who consumes a domestic good-produced using the single-factor labor-and a good imported from abroad; (ii) the economy is "semi-small" in the sense that it has an endogenous terms of trade (in goods) relative to the rest of the world; and (iii) international borrowing is subject to an "upward-sloping" interest rate relationship that depends on the stock of debt. We extend this framework, Þrst, by incorporating preferences that are a function of the relative consumption of imported goods. Furthermore, in this paper we modify the borrowing relationship by specifying that interest costs are a function of the debt to GDP ratio. For convenience, we divide the exposition of the model into two parts: (i) the decentralized framework that is subject to consumption externalities and in which agents take the interest rate relationship as given; and (ii) the socially optimal framework, where the effects of the consumption externality are eliminated and in which the planner internalizes the interest costs of the economy's borrowing decision. To derive a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium in the decentralized framework, we assume that all agents take the same actions, which is the typical procedure in models of this type. Moreover, because the interest rate relationship in this paper depends on the debt to GDP ratio, there is also, in effect, a production externality in the decentralized equilibrium in addition to a borrowing externality. 4 To investigate how the consumption externality interacts with the borrowing constraint, we analyze how the economy responds over time to a permanent increase in the preference "weight" on the relative consumption of imported goods. We show that this causes the economy in the long-run to "expand", i.e., due to higher work effort domestic output increases, which, in turn, results in a decline in the country's terms of trade and a corresponding rise in net exports. 5 As a consequence, the economy supports a higher steady-state stock of debt and consumes more of the imported good (the long-run response of steady-state consumption is, however, ambiguous).
Using a standard phase diagram apparatus, we illustrate the transitional dynamics in response to the increase in status preference. While we distinguish three separate cases, we demonstrate that the transitional adjustment of the economy in all instances involves current account deÞcits, a deterioration in the terms of trade, and declines in the economy's consumption of domestic and foreign goods. In addition, the trade balance, after an initial fall, improves along the economy's saddlepath in order to support the long-run increase indebtedness. In this part of the paper we also describe the behavior of the interest rate on debt and the economy's domestic, "internal" rate of return, the latter depending on the dynamics of the terms of trade.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes the modelling framework and derives the circumstances in which the decentralized economy is characterized by (local) saddlepoint dynamics. To study the interactions between borrowing and consumption externalities, we consider in section 3 the intertemporal implications of a permanent increase in the degree of status consciousness. Section 4 is devoted to analyzing the socially optimal counterpart to the decentralized economy. In this section we analyze how the steady-state and saddlepoint properties of the planner's economy differ from those of its decentralized counterpart and calculate the optimal tax and subsidy policies that reproduce the social optimum.
The paper closes with brief concluding remarks in section 5 and an appendix containing some mathematical results.
The Model and Intertemporal Equilibrium
We introduce the model by assuming that there are a large number of representative agents, each of whom has the following instantaneous preferences over their own consumption of domestic and foreign goods, x and y, status, s, and work effort, l: 6
In this formulation, also employed by Rauscher (1997) 4 utility "weight." 7 We further specify that W (x, y, s, l) has the following Þrst derivative and curvature properties: 8
The function U(x, y) obeys the standard assumptions that utility is increasing in the consumption of own goods and strictly concave. The condition U xy > 0 imposes Edgeworth complementarity on the own consumption of domestic and foreign goods. In addition, (2.2) implies that status is increasing and concave in the relative consumption of imports, while work effort generates disutility and is strictly concave.
Regarding agents' production and Þnancial market possibilities, we assume, Þrst, that the production of tradable output, q, depends on the single factor employment, l, which has the standard properties of positive and declining marginal productivity: q = F (l), F 0 > 0, F 00 < 0. 9 We specify next that the interest rate at which agents borrow depends-in addition to the exogenous and time invariant world interest rate-on the economy's ability to service its outstanding level of obligations, as measured by the debt to GDP ratio. Letting
represent the interest rate on foreign debt, this relationship is deÞned by the following equation
where r * is the given world interest rate and α[b/F (l)] is the country-speciÞc interest cost, which is a positive, increasing function of b/F (l), the ratio of outstanding debt to domestic output. 10 Equation (2.3) is in contrast to most of the work cited above that speciÞes α(·) as a function of b alone. 11 The early study of Edwards (1984) -showing a positive relationship 7 Below, we employ a modiÞed version of δ, given by η ≡ δs 0 (1) > 0, where y ≡ Y in the symmetric equilibrium. 8 The following notational conventions are observed: partial derivatives of functions are denoted by subscripts; derivatives of functions with a single argument are indicated by "primes"; and time derivatives are denoted by "dots". In general, we suppress a variable's time dependence. 9 The implicit assumption of a Þxed domestic capital stock allows us to simplify the analysis, particularly the derivation of the dynamic equilibrium, and to focus on some of the central implications of borrowing and consumption externalities. 10 We assume for expositional purposes that the country is always a net debtor, b > 0, although it is straightforward to generalize the results to the case in which the country is a net creditor, b < 0.
11 Exceptions are Bhandari et. al. (1990) and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004) , who scale national indebtedness between the interest rate spread over the LIBOR rate and the debt to GDP ratio-provides for a set of developing economies some empirical evidence for (2.3). For our purposes, a further crucial advantage of the debt to GDP speciÞcation in (2.3) is that shifts in status preference that change the level of employment (and output) lead to a non-degenerate transitional dynamics, which, on the other hand, do not occur if α(·) is a function of debt alone (see footnote 24 below).
In the context of a perfect foresight, dynamic equilibrium, the agent's maximization problem is formulated as follows
where ρ is the exogenous rate of pure time preference, p is the relative price of the foreign in terms of the domestic good, and b 0 is the inherited stock of debt. 12 Observe that the ßow constraint for the accumulation of debt is formulated in terms of the foreign good. In solving the optimization problem, we posit that the agent takes the average consumption of imported goods Y as given and ignores the effect of his work effort and borrowing decisions on the bond rate r b . 13 Applying standard optimizing techniques for this class of problem, the following Þrst order conditions obtain
where λ the current costate variable, evaluated in terms of the foreign good. Equation (2.5a) is the necessary condition for consumption of the domestic good, while (2.5b) is the corresponding condition for imports. Observe that the marginal utility of imported goods is the sum of the by the stock of physical capital. 12 Since p is the relative price in terms of the domestic good, a rise (resp. fall) in p corresponds to a fall (resp. decline) in the economy's terms of trade. 13 Since agents optimize holding r b constant, it is unnecessary to introduce the distinction between individual and average levels of indebtedness. Also, as is usual in models of this type, the agent takes as given the terms of trade p, although it is endogenous in equilibrium.
"direct" marginal utility U y (x, y) of imports and the marginal utility Y −1 δs 0 (y/Y ) of status, where the latter is scaled by Y −1 δ. Equation (2.5c) is the optimality condition for employment, while equation (2.5d) describes the evolution of the shadow value if international borrowing is selected optimally, given that agents neglect the effect of their choices of b and l on r b . We next impose the following transversality condition that constrains the limiting dynamics of debt and insures that (2.5a)-(2.5d) are sufficient for optimality: lim t→∞ λbe −ρt = 0. The next step is to derive the intertemporal macroeconomic equilibrium. Following the standard procedure for this type of problem, we assume that each identical individual acts in the same way and normalize the population of agents to unity. This implies y = Y holds ∀t ≥ 0 and results in the following symmetric equilibrium
where we substitute for η ≡ δs 0 (1) > 0 in the optimality condition (2.6b) for imported goods.
In our subsequent analysis, we treat η as the parameter measuring the degree, or "intensity", of 
The equations (2.6a)-(2.6d) constitute an short-run system that is solved for (x, y, p, l) in terms of the marginal utility of wealth λ and the status parameter η
where we indicate in (2.8a)-(2.8d) the signs of the partial derivatives of the solutions (x, y, p, l)
with respect to λ and η. 14 The actual expressions for the partial derivatives are stated in the appendix [see (6.1a)-(6.1d) and (6.2a)-(6.2d)] and are interpreted as follows: a rise in the shadow value λ lowers the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, x and y, and as well as the consumption of leisure. The resulting increase in employment, l, and domestic output, q, lowers, in turn, the relative price of domestic goods, i.e., p rises. In contrast, an increase in the status preference parameter η increases the demand for imported goods y. Due the assumption of Edgeworth complementarity (U xy > 0), the higher value of η leads to an increase in the consumption of domestic goods and leisure, i.e., both x and l rise. This, in turn, raises the country's terms of trade so that p falls.
Turning the economy's dynamics, we obtain the differential equations describing the evolution of the marginal utility of wealth and stock of debt by substituting the instantaneous solutions (2.8b)-(2.8d), together with the expression (2.3) for r b , into (2.6e)-(2.6f):
, the corresponding steady-state equilibrium constitutes the following set of relationships
where the symbol˜indicates a long-run variable. Equations (2.10a)-(2.10d) are the long-run versions of (2.6a)-(2.6d), while (2.10e) and (2.10f) state, respectively, that the long-run interest ratesr b andr d equal the exogenous rate of time preference ρ and that steady-state interest service-in terms of the domestic good-equals the domestic trade balance (net exports).
Taking Þrst-order approximations of (2.9a, b) around the steady-state system (2.10a)-(2.10f), the following matrix differential equation is obtained
where
and where we substitute for β = Z 0 − Z(p)/p > 0 in the expression for θ 21 . 15 The stability properties of this system are determined by the signs of the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix J of (2.11a). 16 These are given, respectively, by
where µ 1 , µ 2 are the eigenvalues of J that satisfy the corresponding characteristic polynomial:
A necessary condition for the long-run equilibrium of (2.11a) to possess a saddlepoint is det(J) = µ 1 µ 2 < 0. This requires that the term in square brackets in (2.12b) be negative, i.e.:
If (2.13) is negative, then the dynamics of (2.11a) is characterized by (local) saddlepoint stability,
17 Using standard methods, we then obtain the following saddlepath solutions for consumption and national debt
where b(0) = b 0 > 0. 18 Combining the solutions (2.14a, b), we obtain the stable saddlepath that describes the co-movements of the marginal utility and debt:
The graph of this relationship has a positive slope, which implies that b and λ and evolve in the same directions along the stable adjustment path, i.e., sgn ( ú b) = sgn ( ú λ).
We next derive the phase diagram, illustrated by Figure 1 , of the dynamic system (2.14a, b).
Using equations (2.9a, b), the ú λ = 0 and ú b = 0 loci are described by the following relationships:
The slopes of (2.16a, b)-evaluated in long-run equilibrium-equal:
17 Loosely speaking, the condition for saddlepoint stability in (2.13) implies that a change in the marginal utility has a greater effect on the trade balance than on the bond rate. Observe also that the existence of a saddlepoint in the decentralized equilibrium does not (directly) depend on the interest-cost function α (·) or its "slope", α 0 (·). 18 Because µ1 is an eigenvalue of J, (θ22 − µ1)/θ21 = θ12/(θ11 − µ1).
It is straightforward to account for the positive slopes of the ú λ = 0 and ú b = 0 loci: along ú λ = 0, a rise in b increases the bond rate r b relative to the rate of time preference ρ, putting downward pressure on the marginal utility ( ú λ < 0). To maintain ú λ = 0, a rise in λ is required in order to encourage greater work effort and output, which brings the ratio of debt to GDP back to its original level and, thus, the bond rate equal to the rate of time preference. Thus, points to the right of (resp. to the left of) the ú λ = 0 locus lie on paths in which r b exceeds (resp. is less than) ρ, with λ decreasing, ú λ < 0, (resp. increasing, ú λ > 0). In the case of the ú b = 0 locus, a higher value of b leads, through higher interest service, to a deterioration in the current account balance ( ú b < 0). The latter is not offset unless λ rises, which causes a corresponding improvement in the trade balance and maintains ú b = 0. As such, points to the right of (resp. to the left of) the ú b = 0 locus lie on paths in which the current account balance is negative, ú b < 0 (resp. positive, ú b > 0).
Moreover, the stability properties of the dynamic system are reßected in the relative slopes of the ú λ = 0 and ú b = 0 loci. In particular, the case in which the slope of the ú λ = 0 locus exceeds the slope of the ú b = 0 locus is equivalent to the condition (2.13) for saddlepoint stability: 19
This case is illustrated in Figure 1 
19 This point illustrates an important distinction between the interest rate speciÞcation (2.3) and the speciÞcation of r b that depends on the stock of debt alone. In the latter case, studied by Fisher (1995) , the ú λ = 0 locus is a vertical line, (dλ/db) |λ =0 = ∞, implying that the equilibrium of the linearized system is a unique, interior saddlepoint. 20 For expositional purposes, we restrict ourselves in Figure 1 (and subsequently) to the case in which ú λ = 0 and ú b = 0 describe straight lines, although the relationships (2.16a, b) are not, in general, linear. As such, while we concentrate here on the properties of local saddlepoints, the possibility of multiple equilibria cannot be excluded. y λ < 0, and p λ > 0 in (2.8a)-(2.8c), transitional adjustment along the "rising" saddlepath SS also involves declining consumption of domestic and foreign goods, along with a real depreciation in the terms of trade. Moreover, the trade balance in terms of the foreign good improves along the path from points B to A, eventually eliminating the current account deÞcit. 21 
Dynamics of an Increase in Status Preference
In this section we describe the dynamic response of the small open economy to an unanticipated permanent increase in the status preference parameter η. To calculate the steady-state effects of an increase in status preference, we employ the steady-state solutions, equations (2.10a)-(2.10f), 
Long-Run Responses
The signs of the long-run multipliers with respect to an increase in η are given by:
The steady-state dynamics described by the expressions in (3.1) are explained as follows: a permanent rise in η leads to an increase in the marginal utility of wealthλ, which, in turn, leads to a steady-state rise in employment and output,l andq, a result, as indicated above, comparable those derived by Fisher and Hof (2000b) and Liu and Turnovsky (2004) for single good, the closed economy. With a higher resource base, the economy supports a greater stock of long-run debt,b. Nevertheless, these adjustments do not lead to a change in the steadystate debt to GDP ratio, since, according to the long-run Euler relationship (2.10e),b/F (l) is independent (as are the interest ratesr b andr d ) of the status parameter η. In addition, the increase in steady-state interest service, due to the rise inb, requires that net exports, whether in terms of the foreign or of the domestic good, increase to maintain long-run current account equilibrium. The improvement in the trade balance is, moreover, accompanied by a long-run deterioration in the terms of trade, i.e., by a rise inp. Regarding the long-run consumption of foreign goods, a permanent increase in the preference weight on the relative consumption of imports causesỹ to rise. On the other hand, we can show that the restrictions placed on the (differential of) the steady-state system (2.10a)-(2.10f) are insufficient to determine the sign of the long-run change of the domestic goodx.
Transitional Dynamics
Using the solution (2.14a), the initial change in the marginal utility in response to an increase in status preference equals:
The response of the marginal utility in (3.2) is ambiguous: while the steady-state rise in λ tends to increase the value of λ (0), transitional factors involving the adjustment of (b, λ) along the saddlepath tend to lower λ (0). Nevertheless, we can identify, using the ú λ = 0 and ú b = 0 loci depicted in Figure 1 , three distinct cases. In all three cases, illustrated, respectively, in Figures 2a-c, a permanent increase in η causes ú λ = 0 to shift down: a higher value of η raises work effort, lowering the debt to output ratio and, thus, the bond rate relative to the rate of time discount.
Given the initial value of b, a fall in λ is then required to maintain ú λ = 0. 22 In contrast, the vertical shift in the ú b = 0 locus in response to a rise in η can be positive or negative. 23 The reason for this ambiguity is due to the fact that an increase in the degree of status preference has two, offsetting effects on the current account balance. On the one hand, a rise in η lowers, through higher consumption of the foreign good, net exports. This puts downward pressure on the current account balance and causes ú b = 0 to shift-up. On the other hand, a higher value 22 From (2.16a), the vertical shift in the ú λ = 0 locus equals dλ = − (lη/l λ ) dη < 0. 23 Using (2.16b), the vertical shift in the ú b = 0 locus equals:
where the term in {·} incorporates the offsetting trade balance and interest service effects of a rise in η. To further describe the response of the economy to a shift in status preference, we conclude this section of the paper by considering the behavior of the trade balance, the bond rate r b , 24 If r b is solely a function of b, then ú λ = 0 does not shift in response to an increase in η. Moreover, since ú b = 0 unambiguously shifts up in this case, the shadow value immediately rises toλ with no transitional dynamics. Note, however, that for macroeconomic disturbances such as world interest rate shocks, the speciÞcation of r b as a function of b alone suffices to generate an interior equilibrium with saddlepoint dynamics. 25 The shift in ú λ = 0 in Figure 2c must, however, sufficiently exceed that of ú b = 0 in order for the long-run equilibrium at point L to correspond to higher values ofλ andb.
14 and the domestic rate of return r d . 26 Linearizing the expression for the trade balance about the steady-state equilibrium (2.10a)-(2.10f) and substituting for (2.14a)-(2.14b), its solution path corresponds to:
Differentiating (3.3) with respect to η and evaluating at t = 0, the initial response of the trade balance equals:
Using the deÞnition of θ 21 and substituting for θ 22 in (3.4a), we can demonstrate that the change in the trade balance at t = 0 is given by:
Thus, a permanent increase in η causes the trade balance to deteriorate on impact, a resulttrue for all three cases described above-that depends on the sufficient condition that the longrun equilibrium is a saddlepoint, i.e., det (J) < 0. Using the solution path 
Evaluating (3.5a, b) at t = 0 and combining, we show that both rates initially fall in response to a permanent increase in η, i.e.:
The expression reveals two crucial aspects of the economy's short-run adjustment. One is the 26 The procedure used to obtain the solutions of these variables is found, in the appendix, equations (6.4a)-(6.4b), (6.5a)-(6.5c), and (6.6a)-(6.6b), respectively. fact that since r b declines on impact, it must case that the debt to GDP ratio falls at t = 0. Since the stock of debt is given at t = 0, this means that employment and output initially increase in response to the rise in η, a result that obtains whether or not λ(0) rises or falls. As a consequence, interest service declines in the short-run, which implies that the initial current account deÞcits are caused by the short-run deterioration (eventually reversed) in the trade balance. The other aspect is that the domestic rate of return r d , while also below its long-run value of ρ, lies above the bond rate at t = 0. This is due to the fact that terms of trade depreciates at t = 0, i.e., ú p/p = p λ ú λ(0)/p > 0, which, under interest rate parity, raises the domestic rate relative to the bond rate. 27 Finally, both interest rates rise for t > 0, converging to their common steadystate value of ρ, reßecting both accumulation of debt, which increases the bond rate, and the continued appreciation in the terms of trade, which raises the "internal" rate. The adjustment paths of the two rates are illustrated in Figure 3 , which depicts the initial declines in r b (0) and r d (0) and their subsequent convergence to ρ.
The Planner's Problem and Optimal Taxation

Intertemporal Equilibrium
In this section of the paper we derive the solution to the model from a social planner's point of view. The key distinction between the solution of the planner's problem and that of the representative agent is that the planner "internalizes" the consumption and borrowing externalities ignored by the representative agent. In terms of the consumption externality, the planner assigns to each identical agent the same level of imported goods, y = Y . Likewise, the planner sets the level of work effort and the stock of debt to take into account the fact that these choices affect the interest rate r b at which the economy borrows from abroad. To distinguish the Pareto optimal solution from its decentralized counterpart, we denote the variables of the optimal solution with the superscript "o". 28 The social planner's optimization problem is thus formulated in the following way
where, as before, ρ is the exogenous rate of time preference and p o is the relative price of the foreign in terms of the domestic good. We substitute expression for the bond rate
in (4.1b) to emphasize the fact the planner takes into account the effect that work effort and borrowing decisions have on the bond rate. Solving this problem, the following socially optimal equilibrium is derived
where λ o is the current Pareto optimal costate variable and where the market clearing condition An important implication of the optimality condition (4.2c) for work effort is that the instantaneous solutions in the planner's equilibrium depend, in addition to the marginal utility λ o , on the stock of debt b o . In other words, equations (4.2a)-(4.2d) constitute a short-run system that is solved for as follows Substituting the instantaneous solutions (4.3b)-(4.3d) into (4.2e, f), we obtain the differential equation system that describes the evolution of the marginal utility of wealth and stock of debt
where we substitute in (4.4a, b) for the bond rate. Setting ú λ o = ú b o = 0 in (4.4a, b), the steady-state equilibrium of the social planner corresponds to
where, as before, the symbol˜indicates a long-run variable. Similar to the decentralized framework, equations (4.5a)-(4.5d) are the long-run counterparts to (4.2a)-(4.2d), while (4.5e) and In addition, the decentralized terms of trade are "too low" (i.e., p is "too high") in the presence of the relative consumption externality.
In contrast to these results, the borrowing externality has a more ambiguous inßuence on the decentralized relative to the planning equilibrium. Two basic effects can be identiÞed: (i) in the Þrst, amounting to a relative price distortion, agents in the decentralized economy ignore the effects of work effort on borrowing costs, which implies that employment (and output) are not only "too low" relative to the social optimum, (l −l o ) < 0, (q −q o ) < 0, but also that the terms of trade are "too high", (p −p o ) > 0; (ii) in the second, the fact that the bond rate in the decentralized equilibrium exceeds its socially optimal counterpart implies-due to the negative wealth effect of a higher interest rate-that employment (and output) are "too high" relative to the planner's equilibrium, (l −l o ) > 0, (q −q o ) > 0 and that the terms of trade are "too low", (p −p o ) < 0. In fact, the only variable for which the two effects work in the same direction is the consumption of domestic goods, which we can show-under our assumptions-is less than its socially optimal level, (x −x o ) < 0. For all other decentralized 30 Equating (4.5e) and (2.10e), we obtain
variables, including the consumption of foreign goods, the stock of debt, and the marginal utility-it is ambiguous whether they are higher or lower than their corresponding values in the socially optimal economy. 31
Taking Þrst-order approximations of (4.4a, b) around the steady state (45a)-(4.5f), the following matrix differential equation is obtained
and where
The signs of the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix J o of (4.6a) determine the local dynamics of the social optimum. These relationships correspond to 
31 We can show, nevertheless, that the wealth effect lowersỹ relative toỹ o and raisesλ relative toλ o .
If this condition is satisÞed, then the equilibrium of the planner's problem, like its decentralized counterpart, is a saddlepoint, with J o possessing a negative and a positive eigenvalue:
As in the decentralized framework, we can solve for the following stable saddlepath that describes the transitional adjustment of (b, λ):
Using equations (4.4a, b), the ú λ o = 0 and ú b o = 0 loci in the socially optimal framework are described by the following relationships:
In contrast to the decentralized model, however, the ú λ o = 0 and ú b o = 0 loci in the planning framework are not unambiguously positive relationships. This is evident from the expressions for their slopes, which correspond, respectively, to 
32 In contrast to the decentralized model, the stability properties of the planner's equilibrium depend, through the partial derivatives (y 
How do we account for a negatively sloped ú λ o = 0 locus, which is the case as long as (F − this case is that-in contrast to our previous examples-the stable saddlepath WW is negatively sloped, implying that the stock of debt and its shadow value move in opposite directions in the transition to steady-state equilibrium, i.e., sgn ( ú
What are the implications of the negatively sloped WW locus? Consider the situation in which the initial stock of debt, as in the decentralized economy in Figure 1 , is less than its long-run value, b o 0 <b o . The planner then chooses a "declining" path along WW starting at point R, with ú
From (4.3a, b), it is clear that adjustment toward point Q involves rising-instead of fallingdomestic and foreign consumption:
to close the current account deÞcit ( ú b > 0) between points R and Q, we can show that there must be a corresponding surplus on the trade balance, reßecting in the social optimum the direct positive effects of growing levels of debt on the relative price and output. 34 Finally, the third saddlepoint case in the planner's economy is qualitatively identical to that of the 34 The solution path of the trade balance in the social optimum is derived in appendix, equations (6.11a)- (6.11b) decentralized economy, i.e., both ú λ o = 0 and ú b o = 0 are positively sloped, with ú
The corresponding phase diagram in this instance is qualitatively the same as Figure 1 and is not reproduced here.
Optimal Policy
In this section of the paper, we derive the optimal policy to offset the relative consumption, work effort, and borrowing externalities characterizing the decentralized economy. Given the fact that there are three distinct externalities, three separate policy tools are required to attain the social optimum. We assume that the policy tools available to public sector include a tariff on levied on the imported good, τ y , a tax on domestic labor, τ l , (amounting to a tax on output in this single-factor framework), and surcharges, or "penalties", τ b , on international interest service.
The decentralized individual budget constraint (2.4b) then becomes 10) where the government budget is closed by a continuous adjustment in lump-sum transfers (or taxes), T :
Solving the decentralized problem of section 2 under these constraints, it is straightforward to show that the necessary optimality conditions in the symmetric equilibrium become: 35
The decentralized economy "reproduces" the planner's optimum if the solutions for decentralized case coincide with their Pareto optimal counterparts, i.e.:
and b = b o . The latter obtains if the decentralized optimality conditions for imports, work effort, and borrowing, represented by (4.11b)-(4.11d), equal their socially optimal counterparts (4.2b, c, e):
Solving (4.12a)-(4.12c) in terms of the relevant policy instrument, we obtain following optimal tariff, output tax, and interest surcharge (τ * y , τ * l , τ * b ):
Thus, the optimal policy to offset the effects of relative consumption and borrowing externalities is to levy a positive tariff on imports, a subsidy-rather than a tax-on employment (output), and a positive charge, or "penalty", on international interest payments. In other words, the "over-consumption" of imported goods should be deterred by an appropriate tariff, work effort should be subsidized to achieve the optimal debt to GDP ratio given the upward-sloping interest rate relationship, and, similarly, international borrowing should be penalized to internalize the interest cost externality of greater indebtedness. 36
Conclusions
This paper employs a standard developing economy framework to consider the interactions of dynamics and results in a production externality as well as a "direct" borrowing externality.
The goal of this paper is to analyze an economy characterized by these phenomena and contrast its behavior with that of the social planner's.
To brießy highlight some of the chief results of the paper, we analyzed the response of the open economy in the decentralized equilibrium to a permanent rise in the preference "weight" that agents place on status considerations. We show that this leads to a long-run rise in employment and output-consistent with closed economy studies of this issue-and to current account deÞcits, declines in the consumption of domestic and foreign goods, and a depreciation in the terms of trade during the transition to the steady-state equilibrium. We also Þnd that the bond rate and the domestic interest rate decline on impact and then increase toward their common steady-state value, the exogenous time rate of preference. Due to the depreciation in the terms of trade, the domestic rate lies above the bond rate during the transition.
In the second half of the paper, we study the contrasting steady-state and dynamic properties of the social planner's equilibrium. Focusing on the implications of the borrowing externality, we show that the steady-state debt to GDP ratio and bond rate are "too high" and the long-run consumption of domestic goods is "too low" in the decentralized equilibrium relative to the social optimum. Regarding the other variables, it is ambiguous whether their long-run values are higher or lower than their socially optimal counterparts, due to the offsetting effects of the resulting relative price and wealth distortions. We also derive the intertemporal properties of the planner's economy and show that saddlepath for debt and the marginal utility of wealth can be negatively sloped, which is in contrast to the upward-sloping saddlepath in the decentralized case. Finally, we demonstrate that the optimal policy combination to achieve the Pareto optimum involves a tariff on imports, a subsidy on employment, and a penalty on international borrowing.
6. Appendix Differentiating the instantaneous decentralized equilibrium (2.6a)-(2.6d) with respect to λ, we calculate the following partial derivatives.
(i) For λ:
(ii) For η:
2a)
Expressions for the Long-Run Comparative Statics
Differentiating the steady-system (2.10a)-(2.10f) with respect to η, we derive the following longrun comparative statics expressions discussed in section 3.
To insure ∆ < 0, we impose the sufficient condition (ρbZ 0 /F − β/p) < 0, which also guarantees ∂ỹ/∂η > 0 in (6.3f).
Expression for the Trade Balance
Linearizing the expression for the trade balance in terms of the foreign good, given by T B = Z[p(λ, η)]/p(λ, η) − y(λ, η), we obtain:
Substituting for (2.14a) and using the fact that Z(p)/p −ỹ = ρb, we derive the solution path for the trade balance: 
To simplify (6.5a), we substitute for (θ 22 − µ 1 ) = θ 12 θ 21 / (θ 11 − µ 1 ), using the characteristic equation (2.12c):
This expression can be further reduced by substituting into (6.5b) the elements θ 11 , θ 12 from the Jacobian matrix J of (2.11a). This yields
and is the basis of our discussion regarding the adjustment of r b in section 2.
(ii) For r d :
From the deÞnition (2.7), substituting for (6.5c) and for ú λ using (2.14a), the expression for the domestic rate of return r d corresponds to:
Using the fact that (θ 22 − µ 1 )/θ 21 = θ 12 /(θ 11 − µ 1 ) and substituting for θ 12 , we can show that (6.6a) simpliÞes to:
We can show that the (1 − p λλ /p) term in (6.6b) equals −(V 00 +λF 00 /p)l λ /F 0 , which positive as long as leisure is a normal good, i.e., l λ > 0.
Partial Derivatives of (4.3a)-(4.3d)
Differentiating the instantaneous Pareto-optimal equilibrium (4.2a)-(4.2d) with respect to λ o and b o , we calculate the following partial derivatives.
(i) For λ o : (6.8c, d) where Λ o = (V 00 + λ o F 00 /p o ) < 0. In (6.7a) and (6.7d) we assume that sufficient conditions for x o λ < 0, l o λ > 0 obtain.
Expressions for the Deviations of Decentralized Variables from Their Social Optima
Linearizing the decentralized steady-state (2.10a)-(2.10f) about its socially optimal counterpart (4.5a)-(4.5f), we derive the following system in the deviations of (x,ỹ,p,l,λ) from ( [embodied in the third and Þfth elements of the vector on the right-hand-side of (6.9)]. They can, thus, be considered separately. While it is straightforward to solve for the deviations in terms of the relative consumption externality, we do not state the solutions here, since the corresponding expressions differ from the steady-state comparative statics given in (6.3a)-(6.3f) only because the former are multiplied by the status parameter η. Solving then for the deviations in terms of the borrowing externality, we calculate the expressions that are the basis of our discussion in section 4
10a)
and lettingΛ o = (V 00 +λ o F 00 /p o ) < 0,Γ o = (U xx U yy − U 2 xy ) > 0, andΩ o = −p o (ρ + α 0bo /F ) < 0. To guarantee ∆ 0 < 0 and (x −x o ) < 0, we impose the sufficient condition (ρb o Z 0 /F − β/p o ) < 0 used above in (6.3a)-(6.3f). Observe that we set η ≡ 0 in (6.10a)-(6.10e). 
